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INTRODUCTION
Since its inception in 1990, the Combined DNA Index System
(CODIS) has been used by the federal and state governments to store
millions of people’s DNA data. Initially, CODIS was not in
widespread use; few states participated, and the federal government
could collect DNA only from those convicted of certain violent
crimes.1 Today, however, the picture has changed drastically—some
state governments, and now the federal government, require DNA
samples upon arrest;2 a federal officer has no discretion in determining
∗

Editor-in-Chief, Chicago-Kent Law Review 2007–2008; J.D. candidate, May
2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology; M.S.
(Chemistry), University of Washington, May 2005; B.S. (Chemistry), University of
Washington, May 2002. The author wishes to thank the Fender family (Steve, Lynn,
Erin, Jeremy, and Quintin) and Adam Augustyn for their constant love and
support—the author can only hope she’s returned the favor.
1
42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
2
In the federal government, see the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-162, § 1001, 119 Stat. 2960, 3084. State governments requiring DNA upon
arrest include, at the present time, Louisiana, Texas, Virginia, California, New
Mexico, and Kansas. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:602 (2007); TEX. GOV’T CODE
§ 411.1471(a)(2) (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2:1 (2007); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 296(a)(2)(C) (2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-3-10 (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. 212511(e)(1) (2007). Some of these states require a DNA sample from anyone arrested
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whether a person should provide a sample;3 and the list of “qualifying
offenses” that require DNA collection continues to grow.4 As a result,
more than 4.9 million individual DNA profiles are now available
through CODIS.5
DNA collection is undoubtedly a search under the Fourth
Amendment.6 Moreover, it is a search that occurs without the two
touchstones typically used to guarantee the reasonableness of a search:
a warrant, and probable cause. Not only is there no probable cause,
there is no cause whatsoever—every circuit has evaluated the
constitutionality of DNA collection statutes, and every circuit has
implicitly or explicitly found that the searches take place absent any
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.7 The Supreme Court has not
directly addressed DNA collection statutes, but since the statutes
require collection without any individualized suspicion of wrongdoing,
lower courts have been guided by the Supreme Court’s “suspicionless
search” jurisprudence.
Applying the Court’s suspicionless search law can be difficult.
The Court has, at various times, evaluated the constitutionality of such
searches using one of two methods: the “totality of the circumstances,”
or (the term I will use hereafter for brevity’s sake) “reasonableness”
test; and the “special needs” test. Both frameworks permit the
for a felony (e.g., New Mexico) whereas others require the sample only if one is
arrested for certain violent felonies (e.g., Virginia and Louisiana).
3
E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (“The court shall order, as
an explicit condition of supervised release, that the defendant cooperate in the
collection of a DNA sample . . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(2).
4
42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d). The Justice For All Act requires all felons to provide
a sample.
5
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)
Brochure, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab /codis/codis_brochures.htm (last visited Dec. 5,
2007).
6
Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 676 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that taking a DNA
sample is “clearly a search”); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 493 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (“There is no question that the compulsory extraction of blood for DNA
profiling constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”)
(citations omitted).
7
See sources cited infra note 69.
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searching party to forego the warrant and probable-cause requirements
in limited circumstances, when the government’s interests outweigh
the individual’s privacy interests. The “special needs” test, however,
first requires the searching party to identify a need “beyond the normal
need for law enforcement” that would justify the lack of a warrant or
probable cause.
Only the Second, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits use a special needs
analysis to evaluate DNA collection statutes.8 The Seventh Circuit first
addressed this issue in the 2004 case Green v. Berge,9 when it
interpreted a Wisconsin state statute allowing for DNA collection from
state prison inmates. After acknowledging that DNA collection is a
search under the Fourth Amendment,10 the court noted that DNA
collection may still be reasonable if it falls under one of the exceptions
to the probable-cause requirement.11 The court found that collecting
DNA samples from state prison inmates constituted a “special need”—
a need beyond the normal need for law enforcement—and, as such, it
was an exception to the rule.12 In doing so, the court ignored a number
of other circuits that analyzed state or federal DNA statutes under the
reasonableness test. The Fourth Circuit, for example, had already not
only applied the reasonableness test, but explicitly overruled a lower
court’s use of the special needs test.13
But although explicit reasoning would be nice, the Seventh
Circuit was free to take the path less traveled. Because the Supreme
Court’s suspicionless search case law is fact-specific, dense, and at
times seems contradictory; and because the Court has yet to address
any DNA collection statute; disagreement amongst the circuits was to
be expected and perhaps even encouraged.

8

United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2007) (listing courts).
354 F.3d at 675.
10
Id. at 676 (stating that taking a DNA sample is “clearly a search”); see
Johnson, 440 F.3d at 493.
11
Green, 354 F.3d at 677.
12
Id.
13
Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 n.2 (4th Cir. 1992).
9
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It is not the Green opinion that is surprising; it is the Seventh
Circuit’s next DNA case, United States v. Hook,14 that is truly
amazing. There, the court relied on Green and applied the special
needs test, this time to the collection of DNA from a federal felon on
supervised release. Hook, a white collar criminal, had agreed to certain
terms as part of his supervised release conditions. This included an
obligation that he “follow the instructions of the probation officer.”15
When his probation officer scheduled him for DNA collection, as
recently required by federal law,16 Hook refused, arguing that the
search was unconstitutional.17 Hook had not explicitly consented to
DNA collection, but since his probation officer requested that he do
so, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that his probation agreement required
him to submit to the search.18 As in Green, the Seventh Circuit
evaluated that collection under the special needs approach.19 The court
spent all of one sentence on that choice, simply noting that “[w]hile
some circuits have employed a reasonableness standard” the court had
“employed the ‘special needs’ approach in Green and will do the same
here.”20
This would, of course, be an entirely predictable outcome, were it
not for the fact that both the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit
had, in the intervening period, effectively shut the door on the special
needs test for the type of search at issue here.
First, more than a year and a half prior to Hook, the Seventh
Circuit handed down two opinions addressing suspicionless searches
of probationers.21 In United States v. Barnett, the court addressed a
14

471 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 769-70.
16
See sources cited supra notes 3 and 4.
17
Hook, 471 F.3d at 771-72.
18
Id. at 770.
19
Id. at 773.
20
Id. (citation omitted).
21
The Supreme Court has explained the difference between probationers and
parolees (which are called “supervised releasees” in the federal system). A parolee is
released from prison prior to completing his sentence, and that release is conditioned
upon abiding by certain rules. In contrast, a probationer serves probation time
15
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Fourth Amendment challenge by a probationer who had signed an
agreement consenting to suspicionless searches as a condition of his
probation.22 The court held that a plea-bargained agreement was a type
of contract; consent to the contract terms operated to effectively waive
any Fourth Amendment rights the probationer once had.23 This opinion
was quickly followed by United States v. Hagenow, where the court
not only reaffirmed its adherence to Barnett, but also specifically
disclaimed the use of the special needs test in analyzing these
searches.24
These two opinions anticipated with surprising accuracy the
Supreme Court’s most recent suspicionless search holding. In Samson
v. California, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a
parolee if the parolee consented to searches as part of his parole
agreement.25 The Court flatly refused to apply the special needs
approach;26 instead, it held that under “general Fourth Amendment
principles” a parolee that signed a consent-to-search waiver greatly
reduced his expectation of privacy, and therefore a police officer
would not need reasonable suspicion prior to conducting a search.27
The Hook court, however, failed to mention Barnett, Hagenow, or
Samson—despite the fact that these three cases directly speak to the
Hook facts. As in those three cases, Hook dealt with the suspicionless
search of a parolee or a probationer, and Hook in effect dealt with the
effect of a consent-to-search term in a supervised release
outside a penitentiary instead of being imprisoned. Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct.
2193, 2198 (“Federal supervised release . . . in contrast to probation, is meted out in
addition, not in lieu of, incarceration.”) (quoting United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d
446, 461 (2d Cir. 2002)). Because of this difference, parolees often enjoy fewer
rights than probationers, and parole is “more akin” to prison than probation. Id. at
2198 & n.2; see also text and accompanying sources cited infra note 82.
22
415 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2005).
23
Id. at 692-93.
24
423 F.3d 638, 642-43 (7th Cir. 2005).
25
Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2202.
26
Id. at 2199 n.3.
27
Id. at 2196, 2199.
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agreement28—yet the Hook court made use of an analytical framework
that had been explicitly disclaimed by a previous Seventh Circuit
panel and by the Supreme Court.
This Comment argues that the Seventh Circuit has improperly
applied the special needs test to suspicionless DNA searches. Instead,
such searches should be governed by the reasonableness test used in
Samson. Further, regardless of which analytical framework a court has
adopted, courts have almost universally held that DNA collection
statutes do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure
clause.29 This Comment will show that the Seventh Circuit failed to
consider factors unique to DNA collection when it balanced the
individual and governmental interests at stake. A careful
reconsideration of the weight given to these interests is needed, and
this may ultimately require the court to change its stance on the
constitutionality of DNA collection for probationers and parolees.
Part I(A) of this Comment provides an overview of CODIS, the
various DNA techniques used in forensic sciences, and the expansion
of the CODIS database through recent changes in federal law. Part
I(B) explains what aspects of DNA collection implicate Fourth
Amendment search and seizure law. Part II(A) briefly describes the
balancing inquiries required for the special needs and reasonableness
frameworks, while Part II(B) traces the evolution of the
reasonableness and special needs tests through the Supreme Court’s
suspicionless search jurisprudence. Part III(A) looks to the Seventh
Circuit’s early suspicionless search opinions to provide some historical
basis in the law. Part III(B) provides a detailed analysis of the Seventh
Circuit’s DNA cases, Green and Hook, and Part III(C) provides an indepth look at the waiver issue described in Barnett and Hagenow. Part
III(D) dissects the Supreme Court’s Samson case, and concludes that
post-Samson, the Seventh Circuit improperly employed the special
needs framework instead of the reasonableness test in Hook. Finally,
28

See infra text in Section III(B)(2) for an explanation of how the consent term
was incorporated into Hook’s supervised release agreement.
29
See Nicholas v. Goord, No. 01 Civ. 7891, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1621, at
*24-25 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2003) (collecting cases).
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Part IV argues that the Seventh Circuit should adopt the
reasonableness framework, and that when it does so the court must
reconsider not only the relative weight given to individual and
governmental interests, but also the very nature of the search at issue
in DNA collection. This Part seeks to provides some guidance to those
considerations for the Seventh Circuit as it moves forward with DNA
collection challenges.
I. CODIS – A BRIEF HISTORY
A. CODIS and DNA Collection
DNA. Incredibly, that small acronym contains the key to a
person’s identity. DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid, is a double-stranded
molecule contained in every nucleated cell30 in a person’s body—and
despite the fact that DNA is not visible to the naked eye, this tiny
molecule contains a person’s entire genetic blueprint. Each person,
with the exception of identical twins,31 has a DNA sequence which is
completely unique. As such, DNA allows investigators to accurately

30

A nucleated cell is a cell that contains a nucleus. Human red blood cells do
not contain nuclei, and therefore are not useful for standard DNA testing. White
blood cells, skin cells, saliva, semen, and hair that has been forcefully removed and
still has the follicle attached can all be tested for DNA; on occasion, even urine,
feces, and vaginal secretions may contain the cells necessary for testing.
31
Identical twins are genetically identical, at least at birth. Despite the fact that
identical twins have the same DNA, they may evidence physical differences such as
varying susceptibilities to disease. These differences may occur, at least in part,
because of differences in genetic expression. Mario F. Fraga et al., Epigenetic
Differences Arise During the Lifetime of Monozygotic Twins, 102 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. 10604, 10604 (2005). Although genetically-identical individuals may
seem rare, identical twins actually account for about one in every 250 live births. Id.
(citing JUDITH G. HALL & E. LOPEZ-RANGEL, TWINS AND TWINNING 395-404 (A. E.
H. Emery & D. L. Rimoin eds., 1966)). It is interesting to note that although current
forensic DNA analysis cannot differentiate between identical twins, the tried-andtrue method of fingerprinting can. Anil K. Jain et al., On the Similarity of Identical
Twin Fingerprints, 35 PATTERN RECOGNITION 2653 (2002).
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identify suspects in criminal cases by “matching” the DNA evidence
left at a crime scene to one particular person.32
As techniques were invented that allowed labs to test even the
smallest amounts of DNA,33 courts began admitting DNA evidence

32

Forensic DNA technology has changed drastically over time. Sir Alec
Jeffreys’ article, infra note 33, described restriction fragment length polymorphism
(RFLP) techniques, where DNA is cleaved by special enzymes to produce DNA
fragments that have repeating sequences. The number of these repeating sequences
varies between individuals, so if a person’s DNA is cleaved using multiple enzymes,
a unique pattern of different fragment lengths should emerge. These fragments can
be imaged using various size-dependent separation techniques. NAT’L INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USING DNA TO SOLVE COLD CASES 5-6 (2002),
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/194197.pdf; Phillip Jones, DNA
Forensics: From RFLP to PCR-STR and Beyond, FORENSIC MAG., Fall 2004. RFLP
analysis requires a relatively substantial amount of DNA, however, and the DNA
cannot be degraded prior to testing (as often occurs when the DNA sample is
exposed to heat or light). C. R. Thacker et al., An Investigation into Methods to
Produce Artificially Degraded DNA, 1288 INT’L CONGRESS SERIES 592, 592-93
(2006) (describing DNA degradation). To overcome the problems inherent to RFLP
analysis, laboratories now use the polymerase chain reaction (PCR), which allows
them to take a small amount of DNA and copy it to create a sizeable sample, in
combination with the short tandem repeat (STR) technology that came onto the
scene in the early 1990s. See Jones, supra, and sources cited infra note 33. Like
RFLP, STR involves the identification of specific locations (called “loci”) on a DNA
chain that repeat; these repeats are shorter (up to seven base pairs, as compared to
the six to 100 found in RFLP), so PCR amplification works better. Jones, supra. The
FBI requires thirteen different loci to “match” a suspect to a DNA profile, which
theoretically ensures that a false match is nearly impossible (at least one-in-abillion). NAT’L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, supra, at 6.
33
To briefly trace some highlights in the evolution of DNA amplification
techniques, see Arlene R. Wyman & Ray White, A Highly Polymorphic Locus in
Human DNA, 77 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6754 (1980); Alec J. Jeffreys, Victoria
Wilson & Swee Lay Thein, Hypervariable ‘Minisatellite’ Regions in Human DNA,
314 NATURE 67 (1985); Kary B. Mullis & Fred A. Faloona, Specific Synthesis of
DNA in vitro via a Polymerase-catalyzed Chain Reaction, 155 METHODS IN
ENZYMOLOGY 335 (1987); Randall Saiki et al., Primer-Directed Enzymatic
Amplification of DNA with a Thermostable DNA Polymerase, 239 SCI. 487 (1988);
Al Edwards et al., DNA Typing and Genetic Mapping with Trimeric and Tetrameric
Tandem Repeats, 49 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 746 (1991). For an excellent overview
of DNA technologies in general, including the ones discussed herein, see DNA
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into the courtroom.34 In 1987, a British man named Colin Pitchfork
became the first person ever identified and charged with a crime as a
result of DNA testing.35 Shortly thereafter, a Florida judge allowed the
use of DNA evidence to convict Tommy Lee Andrews of aggravated
battery, sexual battery, and burglary.36 Today, DNA evidence is
routinely admitted, both because DNA has been conclusively
established as a unique identifier, and because as science strains
against the initial limits of the technology, more DNA evidence is
available. Smaller sample sizes, different types of DNA recovery (such
as mtDNA and Y-STR DNA),37 and larger databases in which to

Technologies, NATURE MILESTONES, Oct. 2007, at S1, available at
http://www.nature.com/milestones/dnatechnologies.
34
Tresa Baldas, First DNA Conviction Case Returns, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 9, 2004,
at 5.
35
Stephen Michaud, DNA Detectives, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 6, 1988, at 70.
36
Id. (describing Andrews v. State, a Florida case “in which conviction hinged
almost exclusively on DNA testing”). See Andrews v. State, 533 So.2d 841, 850
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding the lower court’s conviction and stating that
“evidence from DNA print identification appears based on proven scientific
principles.”). Prior to that date, DNA evidence had also been used in a civil context.
See Commonwealth v. Pestinikas, Nos. 85-CR-1020-A-E and 85-CR-1019-A-D,
aff’d, 617 A.2d 1339 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); NORAH RUDIN & KEITH INMAN, AN
INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS 191 (2d ed. 2002) (describing
Pestinikas as the first use of DNA in a U.S. trial).
37
Mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) is a particular type of DNA found in only in
the mitochondria (a particular organelle within the cell) and inherited from one’s
mother; an offspring inherits nuclear DNA, on the other hand, from both its mother
and father. Mitochondrial DNA is useful in that it may be obtained from samples
where nuclear DNA cannot be found (such as in cut hair, which does not have an
attached follicle) and less DNA is needed for testing. On the other hand, mtDNA is
more prone to contamination than nuclear DNA, and since every person sharing a
maternal line will have identical mtDNA, it cannot serve as a unique individual
identifier. See Alice R. Isenberg & Jodi M. Moore, Mitochondrial DNA Analysis at
the FBI Laboratory, 1 FORENSIC SCI. COMMC’NS (1999),
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/july1999/dnalist.htm. Likewise, Y-STR
DNA analysis looks only to the Y-chromosome of a male suspect or offender and
can be used to eliminate a suspect, but generally cannot be used to conclusively
identify the perpetrator. See Isabelle Sibille et al., Y-STR DNA Amplification as

320
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007

9

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 11

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 1

Fall 2007

search for suspect matches all contribute to the ubiquity of DNA
evidence.
The federal government first began collecting and analyzing DNA
samples from felons in 1990.38 In 1994, Congress passed the DNA
Identification Act, which formally recognized the FBI’s ability to
establish and maintain the CODIS national DNA database.39 CODIS is
a three-tiered system: the DNA “profiles” (which are generated via
chemical analysis of the DNA sample) originate at the local level, and
are stored in the Local DNA Index System (LDIS); from there, the
profiles flow to the state system (SDIS), where various state
laboratories are able to share and compare profiles; and finally, the
profiles are indexed in the national system (NDIS).40 Six different
DNA profile categories are maintained: the convicted offender
database, which contains the vast majority of the profiles; the forensic
database, which contains profiles that are gathered from crime scenes
and are believed to originate from the perpetrator; the arrestee
database, which contains profiles from persons arrested for a
qualifying offense under state law;41 the missing persons database; the
biological relatives of missing persons database; and finally, the
database for unidentified human remains.42
CODIS has continued to grow, due in part to ever-expanding
eligibility for inclusion in the system. In 2000, the DNA Analysis
Backlog Elimination Act required federal parolees and probationers to
Biological Evidence in Sexually-Assaulted Female Victims With No Cytological
Detection of Spermatozoa, 125 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 212 (2002).
38
Federal Bureau of Investigation, CODIS—Mission Statement &
Background, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/program.htm (last visited Dec. 5,
2007).
39
DNA Identification Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 201301, 108 Stat.
1796, 2065.
40
Federal Bureau of Investigation, supra note 38.
41
See supra note 2. The FBI may have to change this definition shortly in light
of the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, as this Act extends the reach of DNA collection
to include federal arrestee profiles in CODIS. See DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 1001, 119 Stat. 2960, 3084.
42
Federal Bureau of Investigation, supra note 5.
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provide DNA samples,43 and in 2001, the Patriot Act further expanded
the list of persons required to give DNA.44 In 2004, Congress passed
the Justice for All Act, which expanded CODIS to include those who
had been charged with a crime or, in some circumstances, simply
arrested.45 Most recently, in the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, the
federal government has provided for the inclusion of samples from
both federal arrestees and non-U.S. citizen detainees.46
It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that as of August 2007 the NDIS
contained more than 4.9 million offender profiles and just over
188,000 forensic profiles.47 Over 440,000 of the offender profiles
come from the three states in the Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction.48 And
just as the list of qualifying federal offenses has continued to grow,
Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin are likely to see similar expansions to
their statutes—all of these states are considering expanding or have
expanded the states’ SDIS databases to include, for example, profiles
from persons charged with a crime, convicted of a misdemeanor, or
arrested.49
43

DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546, 114
Stat. 2726.
44
USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 503, 115 Stat. 272, 364 (2001).
45
Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 203, 118 Stat. 2260,
2269. The law allowed CODIS to include profiles from those “charged in an
indictment or information with a crime” and “other persons whose DNA samples are
collected under applicable legal authorities,” provided that the arrestee samples were
not be included in the NDIS. Id. at § 203(a)(1)(B)–(C). They could, presumably, be
included in the SDIS or LDIS systems.
46
DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 1001, 119 Stat. 2960,
3084.
47
Federal Bureau of Investigation, CODIS—National DNA Index System,
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/national.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2007).
48
As of October 2007, the FBI listed 104,176 offender profiles from
Wisconsin; 72,331 profiles from Indiana; and 271,438 profiles from Illinois. Federal
Bureau of Investigation, CODIS—Statistical Clickable Map,
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/clickmap.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2007).
49
Wisconsin has proposed legislation that allows for the collection of DNA
evidence if person is charged with a felony and a court determines that probable
cause exists to believe that person committed the felony. Assem. B. 1, 98th Leg.
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B. CODIS and the Fourth Amendment
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.50
DNA collection statutes have been subjected to a host of
constitutional challenges,51 but here I focus on just one—the Fourth
Amendment challenge. Obviously, the Fourth Amendment only
applies when a search or seizure has occurred. As Justice Harlan
explained in Katz v. United States, a search occurs when an individual
has a subjective expectation of privacy in the object being searched.52
This subjective expectation alone does not suffice—society must also
generally recognize that expectation of privacy as reasonable.53 If both
of these criteria are met, then the search (in the colloquial sense) is a
“search” (in the constitutional sense). As such, it must be supported by

Sess., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2007). Illinois collects DNA samples from those convicted of
certain sexually-motivated misdemeanors, 2005 Ill. Laws 1018, and is considering
legislation that would allow for the collection of DNA evidence upon arrest. H.B.
1901, 95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2007); S.B. 1315, 95th Gen. Assem., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2007). Indiana is also considering legislation that would allow
collection of a DNA sample upon arrest for certain felonies. H.B. 1730, 115th Gen.
Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2007).
50
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
51
In United States v. Hook, for example, the defendant challenged the
collection under the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Thirteenth Amendments, as well
as under the Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder clauses, the Equal Protection clause,
and as a violation of separation of powers. 471 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 2006).
52
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). See Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2001) (applying Justice Harlan’s formulation of a
“search” under the Fourth Amendment).
53
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
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probable cause unless the search falls under one of the exceptions to
the probable-cause requirement.54
Courts have firmly embraced the notion that the extraction of a
person’s blood for DNA analysis is a search under the Fourth
Amendment.55 This result flows from Schmerber v. California, a case
in which the Supreme Court held that testing blood samples for
evidence of drunkenness plainly constitutes a “search[] of
‘persons’ . . . within the meaning of that Amendment.”56 But it’s not
that simple. Some courts have held that more than one search takes
place in the context of CODIS: first, the physical drawing of blood;
and second, the subsequent chemical analysis of that sample.57 Other
54

The definition of probable cause is ever elusive. The Supreme Court has
consistently resisted providing a concrete standard for this idea—it is “a practical,
nontechnical” and “fluid concept,” but the various definitions all have one thing in
common: “a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, [where] the belief of guilt must be
particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized.” Maryland v.
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003) (citations and quotations omitted).
55
Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 676 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that taking a DNA
sample is “clearly a search”); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 493 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (“There is no question that the compulsory extraction of blood for DNA
profiling constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”)
(citations omitted).
56
384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). The collection of DNA using other methods, such
as cheek swabs, also constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. Analyses of
blood, urine, cheek cell, and breath samples have all been held to constitute a search.
See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002) (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist.
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995)); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n,
489 U.S. 602, 614, 617 (1989) (“We are unwilling to conclude . . . that breath and
urine tests . . . will not implicate the Fourth Amendment” and “[although] collecting
and testing urine samples do[es] not entail a surgical intrusion into the body,” the
“chemical analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host of private medical
facts about an employee . . . . Nor can it be disputed that the process of collecting the
sample to be tested . . . itself implicates privacy interests.”); Banks v. United States,
490 F.3d 1178, 1183 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[A]nalyzing the DNA . . . from a cheek
swab[] must pass Fourth Amendment scrutiny.”) (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616;
Schlicher v. Peters, 103 F.3d 940, 942-43 (10th Cir. 1996)).
57
E.g., United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 276 (D. Mass. 2007);
Banks v. Gonzales, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1254 (N.D. Okla. 2006); State v. Transou,
201 S.W.3d 607, 619 (Tenn. 2006) (citations omitted). Some defendants have
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courts have held that “if the initial search is lawful, the subsequent use
of the evidence seized is not a search that implicates the Fourth
Amendment.”58 In at least one case, a court even held that the
defendant did not have the requisite standing to challenge the use of
his DNA profile.59
This debate is not merely one of semantics—it could have
important consequences for a person facing DNA collection. Although
it is well settled that a blood draw is minimally invasive,60 some courts
are increasingly willing to embrace the idea that the chemical analysis
of that blood, at least in the DNA context, may create a significant
privacy concern.61 The weight given to the privacy interest at stake is
of paramount importance, since regardless of which test is used to
determine whether a search is unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, that privacy interest will be considered as a factor in
subsequent balancing.62

attempted to argue that the subsequent comparison of their DNA against other
samples via CODIS is an additional search, though as yet this proposition finds no
support in the case law. E.g., Johnson, 440 F.3d at 498-99 (noting that “the
consequences of the contrary conclusion would be staggering”). The Johnson court
considered two searches: the collection of a blood sample, and the comparison
between that sample and others in CODIS. The court did not consider whether the
chemical analysis was a separate search under the Fourth Amendment.
58
E.g., A.A. v. Attorney General, 914 A.2d 260, 266-67 (N.J. 2007) (citing
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987)).
59
Smith v. State, 744 N.E.2d 437, 440 (Ind. 2001).
60
See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771; Winston v.
Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 563 (1983);
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436 (1957)) (quotations omitted).
61
Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 276; Banks, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1254; Transou,
201 S.W.3d at 619. But see Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 92-93
(2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the only search that occurs in the taking
and testing of a urine sample is taking of the sample, and analogizing the testing step
as akin to the taking of abandoned property, such as garbage left at the curb).
62
See infra Part II(A) for a complete description of the balancing tests.
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II. A TALE OF TWO TESTS: REASONABLENESS AND SPECIAL NEEDS
The Fourth Amendment does not prevent every search by the
government—it only requires that the search be “reasonable.” Nor is
“reasonable” some absolute standard. As the Supreme Court noted,
what is reasonable will depend on the context of the search.63
Generally, reasonable searches require probable cause, and probable
cause is required to obtain a warrant.64 But “probable cause is not an
irreducible requirement of a valid search” and “[w]here a careful
balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the
public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of
reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, [the Supreme Court]
has not hesitated to adopt such a standard.”65
Despite that language, the Court continues to insist that it only has
permitted a few “narrowly defined intrusions” upon a person’s privacy
absent a showing of probable cause.66 Examples of such intrusions can
be placed into two categories: those searches that require some
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, but do not require that
suspicion to rise to the level of probable cause; and those searches that
are completely suspicionless. The former category requires some
amount of “reasonable” suspicion; the latter, at issue in DNA
63

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985).
The Fourth Amendment does not always require a warrant. See, e.g.,
Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (holding that
police officers were not required to get a warrant prior to searching a residence when
speed was “essential” to officers’ safety and the officers had probable cause to
believe the suspect had a weapon and was inside the residence); see also Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Chambers v. Marony, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). In
general, however, those searches that can be executed without a warrant must be
based upon probable cause. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339 (citing Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 412 U.S. 266, 273 (1973); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-66
(1968)).
65
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
66
Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 214 (“For all but those narrowly defined intrusions,
the requisite ‘balancing’ has been performed in centuries of precedent and is
embodied in the principle that seizures are ‘reasonable’ only if supported by
probable cause.”).
64
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collection, is a “closely guarded category”67 that may require other
forms of protection against abuse, such as “programmatic protections”
that divest authorities of discretion in deciding how and when to
administer the search.68
All of the circuit courts have addressed the Fourth Amendment
issues raised by state or federal DNA statutes and all have either
implicitly or explicitly acknowledged that sample collection is a
suspicionless search—one that occurs without any individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing.69 Although the circuit courts seem to agree
on many things—notably, that DNA collection is a suspicionless
search, and that this search is constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment, etc.—the courts vary in how they analyze this type of
search. Some analyze the search under the general “reasonableness”
approach, whereas others first determine whether the search meets a
“special need” before going on to weigh the various interests involved.
One might ask, “If the starting point and the endpoint are the
same, what difference does it make how the courts arrive at their
conclusions?” As we will see, it can and should have a significant
impact. First, however, a brief description and explanation of the
differences between these two frameworks is required.

67

Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 77 (2001) (citing Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997)); see City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,
36-37 (2000) (“[W]e have recognized only limited circumstances in which the usual
rule [requiring individualized suspicion] does not apply.”).
68
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81-82; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45-46 (2000) (citing
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).
69
See generally United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007); United
States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2007); Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d
1178 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d
674 (6th Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United
States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2005); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273
(11th Cir. 2005); Groceman v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2004);
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d
302 (4th Cir. 1992).
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A. Analytical Frameworks
Historically, the Fourth Amendment required probable cause for
any search.70 Over time, however, the courts drifted to a more relaxed
interpretation—one that, in certain “limited circumstances,”71 permits
a search unsupported by any individualized suspicion. In this context,
courts have adopted at least two distinct analytical frameworks.72
The first is the reasonableness standard.73 The reasonableness
standard “requires balancing the need to search against the invasion
which the search entails. On one side of the balance are arrayed the
individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security;
on the other, the government’s need for effective methods to deal with
breaches of public order.”74 In other words, “the reasonableness of a
search is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to
which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the
70

4 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 1386 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed.
2002) (“[B]y the end of the 1920s . . . . [p]robable cause was required for all searches
or arrests. A warrant, obtained in advance, was required at least for searches of
homes, and possibly for many other searches as well.”).
71
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 36-37.
72
The jurisprudence in this area is somewhat confusing, as the Supreme Court
has never set down a clear division between the various categories of searches which
can be supported by something less than probable cause. See id. (describing
permissible suspicionless searches in the context of special needs, administrative
searches, border patrols, and sobriety checkpoints); Kincade, 379 F.3d at 822-24
(describing three non-mutually exclusive categories of suspicionless searches as the
“exempted areas,” such as borders and airports; “administrative searches” in the
context of closely-regulated businesses; and “special needs”); Edwin J. Butterfoss, A
Suspicionless Search and Seizure Quagmire: The Supreme Court Revives the Pretext
Doctrine and Creates Another Fine Fourth Amendment Mess, 40 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 419, 421 (2007) (noting that the Court has never identified a discrete category
of permissible suspicionless searches, and has justified suspicionless searches at
different times as falling under an administrative, special needs, checkpoint or
inventory, or “general Fourth Amendment” approach).
73
E.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (citing Ohio v.
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)) (equating the two standards).
74
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (citing Camara v. Mun.
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)) (quotations omitted).
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degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.”75 Under this standard, “both the inception and
the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable;”76 the latter requires that
the search as conducted must be “reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”77
The second is the “special needs” standard. In those instances
where the government can identify a special need “beyond the normal
need for law enforcement”—a need that makes obtaining a warrant or
requiring probable cause impracticable—it may be able to forego the
warrant and probable cause requirements.78 First, a court must
consider whether the search satisfies a special need.79 If so, the court
goes on to balance the nature of the privacy interest compromised by
the search and the “character of the intrusion” imposed by the search
against the “nature and immediacy of the government’s concerns and
the efficacy of the [search] in meeting them.”80
In addition to disagreeing over which test is applicable for DNA
collection statutes, the courts have also disagreed over which test is the
most rigorous of the two.81 The Third Circuit has held that the
reasonableness test is the most stringent, and it adopted that test when
it analyzed a supervised releasee’s82 Fourth Amendment challenge to
75

Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-19 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295,
300 (1999)) (quotations omitted).
76
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987).
77
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
78
Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
79
For a discussion of what suffices as a “special need,” see discussion infra
Part II(B).
80
Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830-38 (2002) (citing Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)).
81
United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 9 n.6 (1st Cir. 2007).
82
In the federal system, parole was replaced with “supervised release” by the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987. See U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINE SENTENCING: AN
ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING
THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 1-11 (2004), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/15_year_study_full.pdf.
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DNA collection.83 The court applied the “more rigorous”
reasonableness test because the purpose for collecting DNA went
“well beyond the supervision by the Probation Office of an individual
on supervised release.”84 The Eighth Circuit also adopted this
reasoning when it chose to apply the reasonableness test to DNA
collection.85
In United States v. Amerson, however, the Second Circuit
persuasively argued that the special needs test was the more stringent
of the two. In doing so, the court clarified how it is that courts can
apply different tests, yet consistently reach the same result:
The special needs exception requires the court to
ask two questions. First, is the search justified by a
special need beyond the ordinary need for normal
law enforcement? Second, if the search does serve a
special need, is the search reasonable when the
government's special need is weighed against the
intrusion on the individual's privacy interest? A
general balancing test, on the other hand, only
requires the court to balance the government's
interest in conducting the search against the
individual's privacy interests.86

83

United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[W]e believe
that it is appropriate to examine the reasonableness of the taking of the sample under
the more rigorous Knights totality of the circumstances test rather than the Griffin
special needs exception.”).
84
Id. Precisely how this statement justifies the choice of one framework over
another is unclear—if anything, the statement seems to set up the court to adopt the
special needs approach, since the choice rests upon the fact that there are larger
(presumably non-law enforcement) purposes served by DNA collection.
85
United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 2006).
86
United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 79 n.6 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing
Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 664 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005)) (quotations and citations
omitted).
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The court went on to explain that, once one concludes that the
government has a special need to obtain DNA samples, the second
prong of the special needs test becomes “very similar” to the balancing
required under a reasonableness framework. In fact, the court stated
that “had we concluded that it was appropriate to apply a general
balancing test to suspicionless searches of probationers—which we did
not—we would have reached the same result that we do under the
special needs test.”87
The Second Circuit’s reasoning makes perfect sense. The
balancing tests under both the reasonableness and the special needs
standards are indeed very similar. In fact, despite the ostensible
language differences (weighing the government’s “legitimate
interests” in the reasonableness context versus weighing the
government’s “special needs”) most courts do not make this
distinction—they engage in the same balancing test regardless of the
framework they choose.88 Because the balancing prong of the tests are
de facto identical, and because the special needs test requires an
additional step before the court may engage in balancing the interests
involved, the special needs test must be the more stringent of the two.
Most federal circuit courts have chosen to analyze federal and
state DNA statutes under the reasonableness standard. A minority,
including the Seventh Circuit, have chosen to analyze the statutes
under the special needs approach.89 In the next section, I explore the
87

Amerson, 483 F.3d at 79 n.6.
E.g., Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052, 1059 (7th Cir.
2000) (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995)) (listing
the factors for special needs analysis as “(1) the nature of the privacy interest upon
which the search intrudes, (2) the character of the intrusion on the individual’s
privacy interest, (3) the nature of the governmental concern at issue, (4) the
immediacy of the government’s concern, and (5) the efficacy of the particular means
in addressing the problem.”).
89
United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that the
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits use the totality of the
circumstances analysis; the Second, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits apply the special
needs analysis; and the Sixth Circuit has declined to choose a mode of analysis,
holding that the DNA Act is constitutional under both the totality of the
circumstances and the special needs test).
88
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evolution of these two exceptions to the warrant and probable cause
requirement and why it is the reasonableness approach, not the special
needs test, that applies to DNA collection statutes.
B. The Supreme Court’s Suspicionless Search Jurisprudence
The evolution of the special needs test can be traced back at least
as far as New Jersey v. T.L.O.90 T.L.O. has the distinction of being the
first case in which the Court used the term “special needs.” There, a
schoolteacher found a young girl smoking in the bathroom; when
taken to the principal’s office, the girl denied it.91 An administrator
then demanded the girl’s purse, opened it, and found a pack of
cigarettes and some rolling papers.92 The administrator recognized the
papers as typical of those used to smoke marijuana, and continued
searching the purse until he located the drug. After the student was
suspended, she challenged both the initial search of her purse and the
search for marijuana under the Fourth Amendment.
90

469 U.S. 325 (1985). Some persuasively argue that its true origin lies within
Camara v. Municipal Courts. Butterfoss, supra note 72, at 420. In Camara, the
Court examined the warrantless search of a rental unit by a housing inspector. 387
U.S. 523, 525-26 (1967). Despite noting that a routine inspection of private property
was not as invasive as when the police search “for the fruits and instrumentalities of
crime;” the Court nevertheless held that a significant intrusion had occurred. Id. at
534. The inspector was therefore required to obtain a warrant prior to carrying out
the administrative search. That alone, however, did not settle the question. The Court
went on to determine “whether some other accommodation between public need and
individual right [was] essential.” Id. Instead of using the typical formulation of
probable cause—namely, one dependent upon individualized suspicion—the Court
defined probable cause in unique terms, holding that “‘probable cause’ to issue a
warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for
conducting an area inspection are satisfied.” Id. at 538. Camara, therefore, has the
(perhaps ignoble) distinction of being the first case in which the Supreme Court
authorized a search absent any individualized suspicion. See O’Connor v. Ortega,
480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987) (describing Camara as holding that “the appropriate
standard for administrative searches is not probable cause in its traditional
meaning”).
91
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328-29.
92
Id.

332
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007

21

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 11

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 1

Fall 2007

Although the term “special needs” is often attributed solely to
Justice Blackmun’s concurrence, the majority recognized that “the
special needs of the school environment require assessment of the
legality of such searches against a standard less exacting than that of
probable cause.”93 Instead of requiring probable cause, the Court held
that the legality of the searches at issue depended on “the
reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search[es].”94 To
determine whether the searches were reasonable, the Court engaged in
the now-canonical balancing test, weighing the student’s legitimate
expectation of privacy and security against the government’s interest
in dealing with breaches of the public order.95 The Court concluded
that both searches were reasonable and constitutional.96
The Court explicitly limited its holding: even though the searches
at issue were based on individualized suspicion, the Court refused to
decide whether individualized suspicion was “an essential element of
the reasonableness standard we adopt for searches by school
authorities.”97 Although constitutional searches usually call for some
individualized suspicion, such suspicion is not always necessary.98 The
Court warned that those exceptions are few and far between, as they
are “generally appropriate only where the privacy interests implicated
by a search are minimal and where other safeguards are available to
assure that the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not
subject to the discretion of the official in the field.”99
93

Id. at 333. Although the quoted language actually refers to the Court’s
restatement of the Supreme Court of New Jersey and other courts’ opinions, the
Court ultimately adopted the same reasoning, holding that “the school setting
requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are
ordinarily subject.” Id. at 340. Ultimately, the Court required neither a warrant nor
probable cause. Id. at 340-42.
94
Id. at 341.
95
Id. at 337.
96
Id. at 346-47 & n.12.
97
Id. at 342 n.8.
98
Id.
99
Id. (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979)) (emphasis
added and quotation marks omitted).
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The opinion proffers five different approaches to the same issue.
It is Justice Blackmun’s lonely concurrence, however, that continues to
inform suspicionless search jurisprudence today. Justice Blackmun
largely agreed with the majority’s opinion, but he wrote separately to
express concern over what he saw as a divergence from the Court’s
past practices.100 He saw those decisions as illustrating that the
Framers had already engaged in the requisite balancing, and had
determined that “reasonableness” was synonymous with the warrant
and probable cause requirements.101 In Justice Blackmun’s view,
“Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to
substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers.”102 He
defined that special need as the “need for greater flexibility,”103 when,
“as a practical matter,” it would be impossible to obtain a warrant or to
satisfy the probable-cause requirement. Because in T.L.O. teachers,
and not police, were conducting the searches; and because there was a
special need for an immediate response to anything threatening school
safety or learning, Justice Blackmun believed that the searches at issue
were constitutional.104 Two years later, Justice Blackmun’s special
needs framework was formally adopted in O’Connor v. Ortega.105
100

Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id. (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)). See Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 214 (1979) (“For all but those narrowly defined intrusions,
the requisite ‘balancing’ has been performed in centuries of precedent and is
embodied in the principle that seizures are ‘reasonable’ only if supported by
probable cause.”).
102
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
103
Id. (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 514 (1983) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
104
Id. at 353.
105
480 U.S. 709, 720, 724-25 (1987). In that case, a public employer searched
an employee’s office upon an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing—the
employee had allegedly improperly solicited contributions from and sexually
harassed other employees. Id. at 712-14. Although the employee had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his office, the Court did not require a warrant or probable
cause prior to the search. Id. at 721, 724. Instead, the Court expressly drew on
101
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The next key case for our purposes, Griffin v. Wisconsin, is of
particular relevance because it addressed the warrantless search of a
probationer.106 As a felon on probation, Griffin was not permitted to
possess a firearm.107 During his probation, a policeman informed
Griffin’s probation office that Griffin “had or might have” guns in his
apartment.108 Probation officers and the police searched Griffin’s
home, where they found an illegal handgun.109 Griffin challenged the
search; the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the conviction because
under Wisconsin law, the probation officer did not have to obtain a
warrant. Instead, the probation officer only was required to obtain
supervisor approval and to have “reasonable grounds” to believe that
the probationer possessed a forbidden item prior to searching the
probationer’s home.110
As in T.L.O. and Ortega, the party conducting the search had an
individualized, reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, and as in Ortega,
the Supreme Court applied the special needs test to analyze the
constitutionality of the search.111 The Court analogized a state’s
operation of a probation system to that of a school or prison, and
reasoned that the state had a special need—supervision of
probationers—that made the warrant and probable-cause requirements
impracticable.112 The Court recognized that a probationer could never
enjoy the same absolute liberty to which a law-abiding citizen is
Justice Blackmun’s reasoning in T.L.O. to support its holding that the warrant and
probable cause requirements were “impracticable” for “legitimate work-related,
noninvestigatory intrusions as well as investigations of work-related misconduct.”
Id. at 725. And as in T.L.O., the Court again refused to comment on whether
individualized suspicion was an essential element of the standard of reasonableness.
Id. at 726.
106
483 U.S. 868 (1987).
107
Id. at 871-72.
108
Id. at 880.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 870-72.
111
Id. at 873. The Court did so without any discussion as to why it chose to
apply the special needs test instead of the totality of the circumstances test.
112
Id. at 873-75.
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entitled, but also took care to note that the probationer did not lose all
protection against invasions of his privacy.113 After determining that
the search did not require a warrant or probable cause,114 the Court
went on to determine whether that search was reasonable. The Court
agreed that the search satisfied Wisconsin’s “reasonable grounds”
standard and that the search was constitutional because “it was
conducted pursuant to a valid regulation governing probationers.”115
The Griffin decision seemed to signal that the special needs
framework applied to probationer searches, at least when the searcher
had an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. But Griffin, T.L.O.,
and Ortega all dealt with searches as a result of individualized
suspicion; other cases addressed the issue as to whether the special
needs test could apply to suspicionless searches. In using the special
needs test to evaluate suspicionless searches, however, the Court
opened up a new line of inquiry: just what, precisely, is required to
show that a “need beyond the normal need for law enforcement”
exists?

113

See id. at 874.
Id. at 876 (“A warrant requirement would interfere to an appreciable degree
with the probation system, setting up a magistrate rather than the probation officer as
the judge of how close a supervision the probationer requires. Moreover, the delay
inherent in obtaining a warrant would make it more difficult for probation officials to
respond quickly to evidence of misconduct . . . and would reduce the deterrent effect
that the possibility of expeditious searches would otherwise create . . . .”). In
analyzing the probable-cause requirement, the Court relied upon a textual
interpretation of the Constitution, noting that although probable cause might be
required in circumstances where a warrant was not, the reverse was not true, since
“no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” Therefore, when a judiciallyissued warrant is required, “[the search] is also of such a nature as to require
probable cause.” Id. at 877-78. Even absent this reading, the Court would have
required a lesser degree of suspicion since the “probation regime would also be
unduly disrupted by a requirement of probable cause.” Id. at 878.
115
Id. at 880. Earlier in the opinion, the Court referenced Camara, stating that
it had permitted searches pursuant to a regulatory scheme without a warrant or
probable cause when the search met “reasonable legislative or administrative
standards.” Id. at 873. It is not clear whether the Court was stating that the search at
issue in Griffin was such a regulatory search. See id. at 878 n.4.
114
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In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, for example, the Court used the
special needs test to evaluate a suspicionless drug-testing program.116
In response to an apparent increase in “crack babies,” a public hospital
instituted a program whereby it identified nine possible signs117 that a
pregnant woman was using cocaine; upon satisfying at least one of the
criteria, the hospital would collect the mother’s urine for drug testing
without her consent or knowledge.118 Women thus identified as
cocaine abusers were threatened with “law enforcement involvement”
if they did not agree to take part in certain educational activities or to
join a substance abuse program.119
The Court found that there was no reasonable suspicion
whatsoever that the women identified in this manner abused illegal
drugs.120 The Court analyzed the suspicionless search using the special
needs approach, bringing Ferguson in line with four previous cases in
which it had evaluated drug-testing programs.121 In each of those
116

532 U.S. 67 (2001).
These criteria included (1) lack of any prenatal care, (2) late prenatal care
(that is, prenatal care after twenty-four weeks of gestation), (3) “incomplete”
prenatal care, (4) abruption placentae, (5) intrauterine fetal death, (6) preterm labor
“of no obvious cause,” (7) intrauterine growth retardation “of no obvious cause,” (8)
previously known drug or alcohol abuse, and (9) any unexplained congenital
anomalies. Id. at 71 n.4.
118
Id. at 70-72. The consent issue was not addressed by the Court; instead, it
assumed without deciding that the searches were conducted without informed
consent and decided the case on special needs grounds. It then remanded the case for
a determination of the consent issue. Id. at 76, 77 & n.11.
119
Id. at 72.
120
Id. at 76-77. The Court did not undertake its own substantive analysis of
this issue, but it did note that the hospital did not point to any evidence that any of
the nine factors “was more apt to be caused by cocaine use than by some other
factor, such as malnutrition, illness, or indigency. More significantly . . . the
reasoning of the majority panel opinion rest on the premise that the policy would be
valid even if the tests were conducted randomly.” Id. at 77 n.10.
121
Id. at 77. These included Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S.
602 (1989); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989);
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); and Chandler v. Miller, 520
U.S. 305 (1997). The Ferguson Court noted that in the first three of these cases, it
upheld drug tests, whereas in Chandler, the Court struck down the testing as
117
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cases, government officials argued that the search met a special need
“divorced from the State’s general interest in law enforcement.”122
Here, in contrast, the Court believed that the “central and
indispensable feature” of the program was the use of law enforcement
to pressure women into treatment programs.123 The Court
distinguished the three earlier cases in which it had upheld drugtesting programs, reasoning that it had permitted those warrantless,
suspicionless searches in part “because there was no law enforcement
purpose behind the searches . . . and there was little, if any,
entanglement with law enforcement.”124
In fact, the State had argued that the ultimate purpose of the
program was not law enforcement, but to protect the health of the
mother and fetus.125 The Court, however, refused to accept the State’s
characterization of the program’s purpose; instead, it engaged in a
“close review” to make its own determination.126 The Court built upon
the programmatic purpose reasoning it first described in City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond,127 refining the inquiry into one of the
unconstitutional. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 77. In each of these cases, the Court used a
special needs framework to evaluate the constitutionality of the search at issue.
122
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79.
123
Id. at 80.
124
Id. at 81.
125
Id.
126
Id. (citing Chandler, 520 U.S. at 322).
127
531 U.S. 32 (2000). Edmond is not technically a special needs case, since
the Edmond Court discussed its checkpoint cases as being in a category apart from
special needs. Id. at 37-38. In Edmond, the plaintiffs were stopped at a suspicionless
narcotics checkpoint; an officer examined the driver and the car using a narcoticsdetection dog. Id. at 35-36. The Court had previously upheld some suspicionless
checkpoint searches, but it distinguished the facts in Edmond by focusing on the
“primary purpose” of the seizure—in Edmond, the program “unquestionably ha[d]
the primary purpose of interdicting illegal narcotics,” and the Court emphasized that
it had never approved a checkpoint program with the primary purpose of detecting
“evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” Id. at 40-41. Moreover, in permitting
inquiry into the programmatic purposes of a search, the Court included the special
needs framework, stating that its “special needs and administrative search cases
demonstrate that purpose is often relevant when suspicionless intrusions pursuant to
a general scheme are at issue.” Id. at 47.
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program’s relevant primary purpose.128 Even though the ultimate point
of the program was to obtain substance abuse help for expectant
mothers, the immediate objective129 was to generate evidence for law
enforcement, since the “policy was specifically designed to gather
evidence of violations of penal laws.”130 The search could not,
therefore, satisfy a special need beyond the normal need for law
enforcement.131
After Ferguson, the Court seemed to be consistently applying the
special needs test to evaluate searches unsupported by warrants or
probable cause. But in United States v. Knights, the Court revisited the
applicability of the special needs framework when it examined the
warrantless search of a probationer.132 Knights had been sentenced to
probation for a drug offense, and as a condition of that probation he
signed an order that permitted the search of his person or residence
without a warrant or “reasonable cause.”133 Lo and behold, Knights’
apartment was searched—but not without reasonable cause.134 Knights
had a previous run-in with an electric company, and when the
company suffered $1.5 million in damage from an act of vandalism,
Knights became a suspect.135 A detective decided to search Knights’
apartment without a warrant, and upon doing so discovered evidence

128

Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81. The Court distinguished this “primary purpose”
from an “ultimate” purpose or goal—and even where the ultimate purpose was not
related to law enforcement, if the primary purpose was for law enforcement
purposes, the search required a warrant and individualized suspicion. Id. at 82-84. To
allow otherwise, apparently, would be to constitutionalize almost any suspicionless
search, since the search could be justified by its ultimate purpose. Id. at 84.
129
The Court used the terms “immediate objective” and “primary purpose”
interchangeably.
130
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84.
131
Id. at 86.
132
534 U.S. 112 (2001).
133
Id. at 114.
134
Id. at 115.
135
Id. at 114.
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of the crime.136 The district court granted a motion to suppress this
evidence, and the government appealed.137
Knights relied on the Griffin holding, arguing that the search had
to be analyzed under the special needs framework.138 The Court
disagreed, stating that “[t]his dubious logic . . . runs contrary to
Griffin’s express statement that its ‘special needs’ holding made it
‘unnecessary to consider whether’ warrantless searches of probationers
were otherwise reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.”139 But the Court did not explain why the special needs
framework was inappropriate; instead, the Court simply used the
reasonableness test.140 The Court balanced Knights’ privacy interest
against the government’s interests, and began with the observation that
Knights’ probationer status informed “both sides of that balance.”141
Because Knights was a probationer, the Court held that he had a
significantly diminished expectation of privacy; when weighed against
the government’s interest in rehabilitating Knights and in “protecting
society against future criminal violations,” the government’s interests
handily surpassed Knights’.142 The Court limited this holding by
refusing to address the constitutionality of a suspicionless search under
these circumstances—namely, when a probationer consents to
suspicionless searches as part of his probation agreement.143
What, then, are the lessons an appellate court would draw from
looking at the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence up
to and including Knights? Although the special needs framework first
came into being in cases where the searching party reasonably
136

Id. at 115 & n.1.
Id. at 116.
138
Id. at 117.
139
Id. at 117-18.
140
Id. at 118.
141
Id. at 119.
142
Id. at 118-20.
143
Id. at 120 n.6 (“[W]e need not address the constitutionality of a
suspicionless search because the search in this case was supported by reasonable
suspicion.”).
137
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suspected an individual of some wrongdoing, over time the framework
evolved to address suspicionless searches like those in Ferguson.
Griffin seemed to indicate that the special needs framework applied to
probationer searches supported by individualized suspicion, but
Knights indicates that under similar facts, the Court endorsed the
reasonableness test for use in determining whether a search is
constitutional.
In not overruling Griffin, however, the Knights Court left open the
possibility that the special needs framework could still be appropriate
when one is analyzing a probationer search supported by
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, but the Court did not explain
how a lower court would decide which framework to use. Nor did
Knights speak to suspicionless searches—although the Court
apparently thought that it left the issue unresolved, Ferguson indicates
that perhaps the question had already been answered; those cases
might lead an appellate court to reason that suspicionless searches are
governed by the special needs test.
Ferguson and Edmond also specifically call for an inquiry into the
programmatic purpose (or the primary purpose, or the immediate
objective) of suspicionless searches, and ask an appellate court to
engage in a “close review” of any proffered rationales for an
administrative scheme that endorses such searches. Finally, none of
these cases truly clarified what, precisely, was meant by the
requirement that one have a need “beyond the normal need for law
enforcement.”144
It is not surprising, then, that when analyzing a suspicionless
search the Seventh Circuit would understand these cases to endorse a
special needs approach—and this is, in fact, precisely what one sees in
the Seventh Circuit’s suspicionless search case law.
144

Butterfoss, supra note 72, at 422-23 (citing various Supreme Court cases
for the proposition that the Court has, at various times, “expressed concern over, or
suggested a different outcome for, searches motivated by,” for example, a law
enforcement purpose, general crime control purposes, an intent to aid law
enforcement efforts, a purely investigatory purpose, an investigatory police motive, a
search to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, or a search to obtain
evidence of violations of the penal law).
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III. SEVENTH CIRCUIT IMPROPERLY APPLIES SPECIAL NEEDS TO
FEDERAL DNA COLLECTION
A. The Seventh Circuit’s Special Needs Cases
The Seventh Circuit recognized the special needs test at least as
early as 1996, in its Thompson v. Harper case.145 Since then, the court
has proven quite capable of applying the special needs factors—
making the court’s failure to properly balance those factors in its DNA
cases is all the more surprising.
In Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison School Corp., for example, the
Seventh Circuit engaged in a careful balancing of the relevant
factors.146 As in T.L.O., certain high school students were subjected to
random, suspicionless drug (including alcohol and nicotine) testing.147
The Seventh Circuit wasted little time explaining why the special
needs framework was appropriate; instead, after citing various other
drug testing cases where the special needs test was used,148 and noting

145

77 F.3d 484 (1996) (unpublished table opinion). There, the court referenced
Griffin for its understanding that the probation system poses special needs that could
justify warrantless searches unsupported by probable cause, but the court did not
actually engage in special needs balancing. The court took a more detailed look at
the doctrine in United States v. Jones, when it rejected a parolee’s argument that the
only special need capable of justifying a warrantless search unsupported by probable
cause was the “need to act quickly to prevent harm to the probationer and society.”
152 F.3d 680, 686 (1998). The Jones court also noted that it would review de novo a
district court’s determination of whether “reasonable grounds” existed to support
such a search. Id. at 687.
146
212 F.3d 1052 (2000).
147
Id. at 1054-55. The group of students that could be tested included those
involved in non-athletic extracurricular activities and those that drove to school.
148
Id. at 1058 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602
(1989) (using special needs analysis for suspicionless drug testing of railroad
employees); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (same for drug testing of
public office candidates); Vernonia Sch. Dist 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)
(same for suspicionless drug testing of public school students); Nat’l Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (same for suspicionless drug
testing for U.S. Custom Service employees); Willis v. Anderson Community Sch.
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that special needs in particular seem to arise in the public school
context, it dove into its analysis.149 The court laid forth a series of
factors that it used to balance between the government’s interests and
those of the individual, including: “(1) the nature of the privacy
interest upon which the search intrudes, (2) the character of the
intrusion on the individual’s privacy interest, (3) the nature of the
governmental concern at issue,150 (4) the immediacy of the
government’s concern,151 and (5) the efficacy of the particular means
in addressing the problem.”152
In addition to the complicated balancing of these various factors,
the court also had to contend with some of its own unwelcome
precedent. The court previously addressed suspicionless drug testing
in Todd v. Rush County Schools153 and Willis v. Anderson Community
School Corp.154 The Joy panel stated that were it relying solely upon
Supreme Court precedent, it would hold the random drug testing of
students participating in extracurricular activities unconstitutional.155
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, however, the court felt compelled
Corp., 158 F.3d 415 (7th Cir. 1998) (same for drug testing of a public school student
accused of fighting)).
149
Id. at 1058. The court’s language indicates that it may not have realized it
had a choice, as it stated that to “be a reasonable search without a warrant and
probable cause, the government must show a ‘special need,’ beyond the normal need
for law enforcement . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).
150
The court analyzed this factor from two perspectives: first, whether there is
a correlation between the defined population and drug abuse; and second, whether
there is a correlation between the abuse and the government’s interest in protecting
property and life. Id. at 1064.
151
In Willis v. Anderson Community School Corp., the Seventh Circuit placed
particular emphasis on this factor, stating that “it may be that when a suspicionbased search is workable, the needs of the government will never be strong enough
to outweigh the privacy interests of the individual.” 158 F.3d 415, 422 (7th Cir.
1998) (emphasis added).
152
Joy, 212 F.3d at 1059 (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654, 658, 661, 662,
663) (internal citations omitted).
153
133 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 1998).
154
158 F.3d 415 (7th Cir. 1998).
155
Joy, 212 F.3d at 1062-63.
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to affirm the lower court’s decision on the basis of Todd—an opinion
that did not even reference relevant Supreme Court precedent.
Therefore, the court warned against an overly broad reading of its
holding and strictly limited its conclusions to the facts of Joy,156
stating that “[u]ntil we receive further guidance from the Supreme
Court, we shall stand by our admonishment in Willis that the special
needs exception must be justified” according to the factors described
above.157
Whether the court meant to further limit its holding as relevant
only to suspicionless drug testing cases is not clear. It is clear that in
its next special needs case, the Seventh Circuit did not reference the
factors it highlighted so carefully in Joy. That case was Green v.
Berge, the first Seventh Circuit decision to address DNA collection.
B. The Seventh Circuit’s DNA Cases
1.

Green v. Berge

In Green v. Berge, the Seventh Circuit evaluated the
constitutionality of a Wisconsin law that had been amended to require
all convicted felons to provide DNA samples.158 Four prisoners in
Wisconsin’s Supermax penitentiary filed a suit challenging their DNA
collection.159 From the moment one begins reading, it is clear that the
opinion does not bode well for the plaintiffs. The court began by
mentioning that almost all challenges to state- and federally-mandated
DNA collections had failed, and as such, “the plaintiffs in this suit face
a decidedly uphill struggle . . . .”160
156

Id. at 1066.
Id. at 1067.
158
354 F.3d 675 (2004). The Wisconsin law at issue was WIS. STAT. § 165.76
(1993) (amended 1999).
159
Green, 354 F.3d at 676.
160
Id. at 676-77 (“[The] state and federal courts that have [addressed the issue]
are almost unanimous in holding that these statutes do not violate the Fourth
Amendment.”).
157
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The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that taking a person’s DNA is
a search161 and that there was no individualized reasonable suspicion
to believe these prisoners had committed a new crime.162 Without
addressing the facts specific to this case, the court proffered other
courts’ justifications for upholding these statutes:
Courts uphold these DNA collection statutes
because the government interest in obtaining
reliable DNA identification evidence for storage in
a database and possible use in solving past and
future crimes outweighs the limited privacy
interests that prisoners retain. Also, courts generally
conclude that the collection of biological samples is
only a minimal intrusion on one’s personal physical
integrity. These courts find that the government has
a special need in obtaining identity DNA
samples.163
The court agreed with the Tenth Circuit that a desire to build a
DNA database went beyond the ordinary needs of law enforcement.164
It then explicitly adopted the reasoning of Chief Judge Crabb in the
Western District of Wisconsin, who held that “[a]lthough the state’s
DNA testing of inmates is ultimately for a law enforcement goal,”
DNA collection seemed “to fit within the special needs
analysis . . . since it is not undertaken for the investigation of a specific
crime.”165

161

Id. at 676-77 (“Although the taking of a DNA sample is clearly a search,
the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches, only those that are
unreasonable.”).
162
Id. at 676.
163
Id. at 677.
164
Id. (citing United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003)).
165
Id. at 678 (citing Shelton v. Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp. 1048, 1050-51 (W.D.
Wis. 1996)). The court strongly agreed, calling the special needs framework “firmly
entrenched” later in the opinion. Id. at 679.
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The plaintiffs argued that the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Edmond and Ferguson dictated a contrary result.166 Those opinions
required inquiry into a suspicionless search program’s primary purpose
or immediate objective. Since the plaintiffs believed that the primary
purpose of DNA collection was to assist law enforcement, it followed
that the search could not meet a special need.
The Seventh Circuit did not find Edmond or Ferguson applicable.
It first distinguished Edmond, finding that the primary purpose of the
Edmond search had been to see if “then and there” a driver was using
illegal drugs. In contrast, the court held that Wisconsin’s DNA statute
did not have the purpose of searching for evidence of criminal
behavior; instead, its purpose was to “obtain reliable proof of a felon’s
identity.”167 The court also distinguished Ferguson. It interpreted
Ferguson to show that the Supreme Court classified suspicionless drug
testing cases as constitutional if (1) the person providing a sample
understood the purpose of the test, and (2) the results of the test were
protected from dissemination to third parties.168 Because the Green
plaintiffs did not misunderstand the purpose of the DNA test, and
because the Wisconsin statute prohibited unauthorized dissemination
of the results, Ferguson was of little assistance. The court concluded
that Wisconsin’s DNA statute was constitutional.
Judge Easterbrook concurred. Although he joined the opinion
without reservation, he wrote separately to express concern over the
“lump[ing] together” of all persons potentially subjected to DNA
collection.169 In his view, at least four distinct categories of persons
exist for Fourth Amendment purposes: prisoners, people on
conditional release, felons with expired terms, and those never
convicted of a felony.170 Belying his own classification scheme,
however, Judge Easterbrook did not take issue with DNA collection
from within the first three categories; instead, he argued that only
166

Id. at 678.
Id.
168
Id. at 678-79.
169
Id. at 679 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
170
Id. at 680.
167
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DNA collection from those in the fourth category might require a
special need or individualized suspicion.171 He criticized a Ninth
Circuit opinion that had applied the special needs framework to the
DNA collection of a person on supervised release, claiming that the
court “confuse[d] the fourth category with the second.”172 The judge
concluded by noting that the fourth category was not at issue in Green,
and that he read the court’s opinion to mean that a suspicionless DNA
search was only permissible when conducted on those persons outside
of his fourth category.173
The Green opinion left many issues unresolved. Notably, the court
did not address whether other searches occur in the context of DNA
testing, such as, for example, the chemical analysis of a DNA
sample.174 Nor did the court identify why the special needs framework,
as opposed to the reasonableness framework, was the appropriate
choice in this case of first impression. The Seventh Circuit also failed
to evaluate those factors crucial in determining whether a special need
exists, despite having identified the factors both in Joy175 and in its
adoption of Chief Judge Crabb’s factor list in Green.176 The court
simply accepted the outcome of other courts’ balancing. Finally,
although Judge Easterbrook raised the subject, the majority opinion
failed to address what effect, if any, the “continuum of possible
punishments ranging from solitary confinement . . . to a few hours of
mandatory community service”177 would have on its special needs
analysis, since expectations of privacy vary as a convict’s status

171

Id. at 680-81.
Id. at 681. Judge Easterbrook’s reasoning is less than clear, since his own
Green panel applied special needs analysis to imprisoned felons (thereby apparently
confusing the fourth category with the first).
173
Id.
174
See cases cited supra notes 55-62 & 254-57 and accompanying text.
175
See discussion supra Part III(A).
176
Green, 354 F.3d at 678 (citing Shelton v. Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp. 1048,
1050-51 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (listing the factors the Supreme Court used to determine
the reasonableness of various searches)).
177
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987).
172
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changes. But despite these issues, the next Seventh Circuit case to
address DNA collection adopted the Green reasoning wholesale.
2.

U.S. v. Hook

In United States v. Hook, the Seventh Circuit revisited the issue of
DNA collection.178 George Hook was a white collar criminal,
convicted of wire fraud, money laundering, and theft from an
employee benefit plan.179 After serving his full prison term, he began
serving his thirty-six month period of supervised release.180 As one of
the terms of his release, Hook agreed to “follow the instructions of the
probation officer.”181 That agreement was put to the test when, after
about a year into his supervised release, Hook’s probation officer
requested that Hook submit a DNA sample under the recently enacted
Justice for All Act of 2004.182 Hook refused, and filed a petition in the
Northern District of Illinois challenging the collection.183
At the district court, Judge Lefkow recognized that courts have
used two different approaches in analyzing DNA collection statutes.184
The judge felt that there was no “constitutionally relevant distinction”
between the Wisconsin law analyzed in Green and the facts in Hook’s
case.185 Therefore, relying on Green, she used the special needs
approach to determine whether Hook’s DNA collection was
reasonable.186 Guided by the Supreme Court’s Edmond holding, she
looked to the primary purpose of the federal DNA collection statute,
and found that the “ultimate goal” was solving past and future crimes,
178

471 F.3d 766 (2006).
Id. at 769.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 770.
182
Id. at 769.
183
United States v. Hook, No. 04-CR-1045, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2386, at
*1-13 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 2006).
184
Id. at *5.
185
Id. at *7.
186
Id.
179
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exonerating innocent persons, and deterring recidivism.187 These
purposes went beyond the ordinary need for law enforcement, and
constituted a special need.
That being the case, the district court then moved on to the
reasonableness analysis, weighing Hook’s privacy interests against the
government’s special need.188 Citing Griffin, she held that people on
conditional release have a greatly diminished expectation of privacy,
and have no privacy interest in proof of their identities.189 That Hook
had not explicitly consented to providing a DNA sample as a term of
his release was of no import—the court stated that this had no effect
on Hook’s expectation of privacy.190 Judge Lefkow defined the search
at issue as the extraction of blood, and in accordance with other courts
held that such an intrusion was minimal.191 Although the government
in this case did not identify its interests in the DNA collection, the
judge used the same interests she had identified as providing a special
need—solving crime, promoting accuracy in the judicial system, and
reducing recidivism—to find that the government had “several
important government interests.”192 The district court therefore denied
Hook’s petition,193 and Hook appealed.
At the Seventh Circuit, the panel largely agreed with Judge
Lefkow’s analysis. Prior to diving into the special needs analysis,
though, the court addressed the issue of consent.194 Hook argued that
because DNA collection was not included in the original terms of his
supervised release agreement, he was not required to provide a

187

Id. at *8-9.
Id. at *9-10.
189
Id. (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987); United States v.
Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2005); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273,
1279-80 (11th Cir. 2005)).
190
Id. at *11 n.3.
191
Id. at *11.
192
Id. at *11-12.
193
Id. at *25.
194
United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 770 (7th Cir. 2006).
188
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sample.195 The court remained unpersuaded: “[T]he original term of
supervised release instituted by the district court required Hook to
‘follow the instructions of the probation officer’ . . . . In this case, the
probation officer instructed Hook to submit to DNA collection, and
this brings the DNA collection into his original sentence.”196 In
addition, the court noted that the district court held a hearing before
ordering Hook to comply with the DNA collection. That hearing
satisfied the conditions precedent to modifying the terms of supervised
release.197 Hook also argued that there was, in effect, a breach of
contract—but Hook was sentenced by a jury, and was not on probation
as the result of a plea agreement. The court found that no contract
existed.198
After addressing those arguments, the court analyzed Hook’s
Fourth Amendment claim. As at the district court, the Seventh Circuit
felt that the federal DNA act presented issues identical to those in
Green.199 Hook tried to distinguish Green by noting that Green dealt
with incarcerated felons, whereas he was only on supervised release—
but the court found that this was “a distinction without difference for
the purposes of the DNA Act and the Fourth Amendment.”200
The court acknowledged that other circuits used the
reasonableness standard, but was not persuaded to change or even
justify its special needs framework. Instead, the court stated that
“[w]hile some circuits have employed a reasonableness standard, we
employed the ‘special needs’ approach in Green and will do the same
here.”201 Reiterating its Green reasoning, the court again held that the
purpose of DNA collection was not ordinary law enforcement, but to
195

Id.
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id. at 771. Instead, Hook’s situation is more akin to that in Hagenow, with
the probation term being a part of the original sentence. See discussion infra section
III(C).
199
Hook, 471 F.3d at 772.
200
Id.
201
Id. at 773 (citations omitted).
196
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“establish a database of accurate felon identification information and
to deter recidivism, not to search for information on a specific crime or
to detect ‘ordinary criminal wrongdoing.’”202 The court also took
solace in the fact that the federal DNA Act provides penalties for
unauthorized access to CODIS, and that a probation officer has no
discretion in deciding whether someone must provide a sample.203
The purpose of the above reasoning was solely to establish that a
special need did, in fact, exist. The court did not engage in the
reasonableness balancing anew—after finding a special need, the court
simply “appl[ied] the reasoning in Green” and concluded that Hook’s
DNA collection did not violate the Fourth Amendment.204
Of course, as noted above, the Green court also failed to engage in
a detailed balancing of the interests at issue. The court clearly was
capable of doing so, as it already had in Joy and other special needs
cases. But as alluded to earlier, the problems in Hook go far beyond a
mere failure to flesh out important considerations left unresolved in
Green. In the time between Green and Hook, three opinions made it
clear that the special needs approach was not the appropriate method
for determining the constitutionality of DNA collection, at least insofar
as that collection takes place in the context of supervised releasees.
The first two of these cases were Seventh Circuit opinions that
addressed the effect of a waiver, much like the one the court read into
Hook’s supervised release agreement.
C. Waiver, Barnett, and Hagenow
About a year and a half after the Seventh Circuit issued the Green
opinion, it took up suspicionless searches again in United States v.
Barnett.205 The court’s opinion bears little resemblance to Green;
instead, the court focused almost entirely on the issue of waiver. In
Barnett, a probationer plea bargained with the government and agreed
202

Id.
Id.
204
Id.
205
415 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2005).
203
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to various probation conditions in lieu of serving prison time.206 One
of the conditions required Barnett to permit searches of his body,
home, and any other effects whenever his probation officer requested
access.207 Barnett agreed, and at some point (the court does not go into
the facts of the case) his probation officer searched his house and
found a gun.208 Barnett challenged the blanket waiver of his Fourth
Amendment rights as unconstitutional—the issue the Supreme Court
left open in Knights.
The court quickly disposed of the case, noting that
“[c]onstitutional rights like other rights can be waived, provided that
the waiver is knowing and intelligent.”209 Further, plea bargains are a
form of contract, and are evaluated according to the norms of contract
interpretation.210 Therefore, the plea bargain had to be interpreted “in
light of common sense,”211 meaning it implicitly forbade those
searches having no law enforcement purpose as well as those greatly
exceeding legitimate law enforcement needs.212
Finally, Barnett pointed to discrepancies between his particular
probation agreement (which permitted suspicionless searches) and the
probation office’s policy manual (which required reasonable suspicion
of a parole violation or crime). He argued that the policy manual’s
206

Id. at 691.
Id.
208
Id.
209
Id. Some courts have held that probationers’ blanket waivers of Fourth
Amendment rights are valid; others have imposed limits on how, if at all, such rights
may be waived. Such a discussion is beyond the scope of this note. See generally Jay
M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity of Requirement that, as Condition of Probation,
Defendant Submit to Warrantless Searches, 99 A.L.R. 5TH 557 (2002); Antoine
McNamara, The “Special Needs” of Prison, Probation, and Parole, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 209, 235-36 (2007) (noting that the common counterargument to the Seventh
Circuit’s Barnett reasoning is the doctrine of “unconstitutional conditions,” but also
noting that the doctrine itself is the subject of debate).
210
Barnett, 415 F.3d at 692-93 (citations omitted).
211
Id. at 692 (quoting McElroy v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 73 F.3d 722, 726-27
(7th Cir. 1996)).
212
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203 (1981)).
207
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terms should be implicitly included in his agreement.213 The court
deftly dispatched this argument using standard contract construction: if
an indefinite contract should not be enforced, the court could
invalidate the plea agreement, thereby placing Barnett back before a
court for resentencing.214 Since Barnett did not appear to relish this
option, the court left the contract undisturbed.215
Less than two months after the Barnett opinion, the Seventh
Circuit further fleshed out its answer to the Knights question. As in
Barnett, the probationer in United States v. Hagenow signed a waiver
permitting suspicionless searches of his person or property.216 The
court provided a two-pronged response. First, it held that a reasonable
suspicion of wrongdoing existed, which alone would validate the
search.217 Second, it held that under Barnett, a blanket waiver of
Fourth Amendment rights eliminates any expectation of privacy that a
probationer might have, which likewise eliminates the need for any
individualized suspicion.218 This was true even though in Barnett, the
court used a “plea bargain as contract” approach, whereas in Hagenow
the probationer did not have a plea bargain, but merely consented to
searches as a condition of his probation—the waivers were “similar”
and the same reasoning applied.219 As a result, the Seventh Circuit
held that the suspicionless search of a probationer who consented to all
searches as a condition of parole is inherently reasonable.
Perhaps more importantly for the purposes of this note, the court
also specifically recognized and disregarded the special needs
213

Id. at 693.
Id. Under this analysis, it would appear that probation office policy manuals
are meaningless—either the same terms appear in both the manual and the individual
probationer’s agreement, and no indefiniteness exists; or there are discrepancies
between the two, and a probationer can challenge the probation agreement only if he
is willing to give up probation entirely. It is hard to imagine a probationer willing to
choose that route to make a point.
215
Id.
216
423 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2005).
217
Id. at 642-43.
218
Id. at 643.
219
Id.
214
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framework.220 Hagenow attacked the search by arguing that Griffin
required a special need; the Seventh Circuit parried, citing the Knights
Court’s rejection of this argument.221 The court concluded that
“[b]ecause Hagenow signed a waiver agreeing to submit to searches
while on probation, this case falls under Knights and its progeny, not
Griffin, and the ‘special needs’ test does not apply.”222
After Barnett and Hagenow, a strong argument can be made that a
consent-to-search clause in a probation agreement automatically
renders a suspicionless search constitutional in the Seventh Circuit.
Further, the Hagenow court specifically cautioned against use of the
special needs analysis when consent to a search had been given. And
Green, of course, did not speak to this issue, as the DNA searches in
that case were performed on prisoners who did not consent to the
search.
How does all of this relate to DNA collection? Under federal law,
a sentencing court that grants a period of supervised release now must
include “as an explicit condition of supervised release, that the
defendant cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample” if DNA
collection is otherwise required under the DNA Analysis Backlog
Elimination Act.223 Under this DNA Act, samples must be collected
from anyone convicted of (1) any felony; (2) any offense listed in
chapter 109A, title 18 of the United States Code; (3) any crime of
violence, as that term is defined in section 16, title 18 of the United

220

Id. (“[T]he Griffin v. Wisconsin ‘special needs’ doctrine does not apply
here.”) (citation omitted).
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2000). The DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act
of 2000 also states that “[t]he probation office responsible for the supervision under
Federal law of an individual on probation, parole, or supervised release shall collect
a DNA sample from each such individual who is, or has been, convicted of a
qualifying Federal . . . or a qualifying military offense . . . .” 42 U.S.C.
§ 14135a(a)(2) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
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States Code; or (4) any attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the
offenses listed above.224
Therefore, a person placed on supervised release after the recent
spate of amendments to the federal DNA statute would necessarily
have to sign a blanket waiver like those seen in Barnett and
Hagenow—the person would have to consent to the suspicionless
search that occurs when DNA is collected.225 In effect, such was the
case in Hook—as I explained above, at the time Hook was placed on
supervised release he did not explicitly consent to DNA collection; the
Seventh Circuit read the DNA collection condition into his agreement.
Nonetheless, the Hook court did not follow, nor did it even mention,
Barnett and Hagenow. Instead, the court relied almost exclusively on
its Green opinion, thereby directly contradicting its own precedent.
In addition to ignoring its own relevant precedent, the Seventh
Circuit also failed to account for a Supreme Court opinion that issued
well in advance of the arguments in Hook. That decision, Samson v.
California, was anticipated by both Barnett and Hagenow—like
Barnett and Hagenow, the Samson opinion dealt directly with the
Supreme Court’s Knights holding. But as with those Seventh Circuit
opinions, the Hook court ignored Samson—an oversight that is all the
more inexplicable given that Judge Easterbrook explicitly relied upon
Knights in his Green concurrence.226

224

42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d) (as amended by the Justice For All Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 203, 118 Stat. 2260).
225
Failure to consent to such a search is a misdemeanor under the federal DNA
collection statutes, and the refusing person “shall be punished” as mandated by Title
18 of the United States Code. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(5)(A)–(B). The collecting party
may “may use or authorize the use of such means as are reasonably necessary to
detain, restrain, and collect a DNA sample from an individual who refuses to
cooperate in the collection of the sample.” 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(4)(A). This is also
true in at least some states: in California, for example, “use of reasonable force” is
appropriate to obtain a sample from an offender that refuses to cooperate. CAL.
PENAL CODE 298.1(a)–(c) (2007).
226
Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 680-81 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring).
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D. Survival of Special Needs in Light of Samson v. California
In Samson v. California, the Supreme Court sought to answer a
question it left open in Knights: “whether a condition of release can so
diminish or eliminate a released prisoner’s expectation of privacy that
a suspicionless search by a law enforcement officer” would be
constitutional.227 Under California law, every prisoner eligible for
parole has to sign an agreement permitting suspicionless searches and
seizures by a parole officer at any time.228 In Samson, a police officer
saw Samson, a parolee—one that the officer believed had an
outstanding warrant—walking down the street.229 When the officer
stopped Samson, however, Samson told him that no outstanding
warrant existed.230 The officer verified this information, but still
decided to search Samson. Upon doing so, the officer discovered
methamphetamine.231 Samson was charged with possession, and filed
a motion to suppress on the basis that the search was
unconstitutional.232 At the trial court, the judge denied Samson’s
motion to suppress the evidence; the California appellate court
affirmed that ruling, since in California, a search is reasonable as long
as it is not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing.233
The Supreme Court took up the case to resolve the Knights issue,
and used the reasonableness framework instead of the special needs
test in doing so. The Court declined to use the special needs approach
because “under general Fourth Amendment principles” such an
analysis was unnecessary.234 The Court reiterated the proper balancing
test for determining whether a search is reasonable: the test requires
227

126 S. Ct. 2193, 2196 (2006).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 3067(a) (West 2000).
229
Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2196.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
People v. Samson, No. A102394, 2004 WL 2307111, at *1-3 (Cal. Ct. App.
Oct. 14, 2004).
234
Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2199 n.3.
228
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weighing the degree to which the search intrudes on a person’s privacy
against the degree to which the search promotes a legitimate
governmental interest.235 Under Knights, the Court had already
addressed that balancing, and it adopted the same weighing of interests
in Samson.236
Moreover, as in Knights, the Court focused on the fact that
Samson consented to suspicionless searches.237 While that condition
weighed heavily in the Court’s balancing test (as Samson’s awareness
that he could be searched at any time served to significantly diminish
any expectation of privacy that he had), the Court did not rely on the
consent-to-search condition in Samson’s parolee agreement as the
basis for its holding.238 This allowed the Court to definitively answer
the question it left in Knights—the Court’s reasonableness analysis
alone provided its rationale for holding that the search was
constitutional.239
The Court also fleshed out the “continuum” of privacy interests
that go along with varying punishments in the penal system. In
Knights, the Court had held that probationers did not enjoy the same
rights as free citizens; in Samson, the Court further found that parole
was “more akin” to imprisonment than probation—meaning that a
parolee has less of an expectation of privacy than a probationer.240 But
the Court drew the line at the dissent’s characterization of that holding,
and stated that it did not go so far as to find that parolees had no
Fourth Amendment rights.241 After weighing Samson’s diminished
expectation of privacy against important governmental interests such
235

Id. at 2197.
Id.
237
Id. at 2199.
238
Id. at 2199 n.3.
239
Id. The Court refrained from doing so in part because the California
Supreme Court had not yet had a chance to construe the statute that required a
consent-to-search provision in any parolee’s agreement. Id.
240
Id. at 2197-98. Note that under the current federal sentencing guidelines,
parole has been replaced by supervised release. See supra notes 21 and 82 and
accompanying text.
241
Id. at 2198.
236
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as supervising parolees and reducing recidivism, the Court concluded
that the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.242
After Samson, how could the Seventh Circuit still believe the
special needs approach was appropriate? After all, Hook was a
supervised releasee and the court interpreted his agreement to include
DNA collection. One answer could lie in the Second Circuit’s
reasoning. The Second Circuit, along with the Tenth Circuit, had
previously joined the Seventh in applying the special needs framework
to DNA collection. In United States v. Amerson, the Second Circuit
revisited DNA collection.243 Contrary to the Seventh Circuit’s
approach, the Second Circuit realized that Samson warranted
discussion. Interestingly, in Amerson the Second Circuit held that the
special needs test remained viable.244 But the Amerson case dealt with
two probationers, and the court strictly limited its reading of Samson,
noting:
While after Samson it can no longer be said that ‘the
Supreme Court has never applied a general
balancing test to a suspicionless-search regime,’
nothing in Samson suggests that a general balancing
test should replace special needs as the primary
mode of analysis of suspicionless searches outside
the context of the highly diminished expectation of
privacy presented in Samson. . . . [T]he Supreme
Court has not, to date, held that the expectations of
privacy of probationers are sufficiently diminished
to permit probationer suspicionless searches to be
tested by a general balancing test . . . .245
Even under Amerson’s rejection of the reasonableness test, then,
Hook’s DNA collection would have been analyzed under the
242

Id. at 2200-02.
483 F.3d 73 (2007).
244
Id. at 89.
245
Id. at 79 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
243
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reasonableness test, since Hook, like Samson, was on supervised
release (or parole, depending on the language of the jurisdiction).
The Tenth Circuit also found that Samson modified its
suspicionless search law. In United States v. Freeman, that court
reinterpreted the Griffin line of cases.246 It limited the special needs
test to apply only to those searches conducted by a parole officer,
because it felt that the rehabilitative relationship between officer and
parolee was key to Griffin’s reasoning.247 The Tenth Circuit still
shifted its position on the special needs test post-Samson, however,
holding that suspicionless searches by “ordinary law enforcement
officers” would be evaluated under the reasonableness test.248
Perhaps, then, Freeman could provide some justification for the
outcome of Hook, since Hook’s DNA collection was at the behest of
his parole officer—but the Seventh Circuit’s own case law forecloses
that avenue. Although Barnett relied upon the existence of a plea
agreement to interpret the consent-to-search provisions as part of a
contract, Hagenow had no such limitation—Hagenow had no plea
agreement, but the Seventh Circuit held that Hagenow’s waiver alone
made the search reasonable. Further, both Hagenow and Barnett were
probationers, and under Samson they both have a greater expectation
of privacy than the supervised releasee in Hook.
Finally, under the Tenth Circuit’s Freeman holding, if the court in
Hook had not read DNA collection into the terms of Hook’s probation
agreement, the outcome might have been different—in Hook’s case.
Going forward, such reasoning is bound to fail since the federal DNA
collection statutes now require consent to DNA collection in every
eligible supervised releasee’s agreement.249 While the federal
government and some state governments may require some amount of

246

479 F.3d 743 (10th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 748.
248
Id.
249
18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2000) (“The court shall order, as an explicit condition
of supervised release, that the defendant cooperate in the collection of a DNA
sample . . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(2) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
247
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individualized suspicion before searching in other cases,250 the federal
government is the entity that requires a suspicionless search in the
context of DNA collection. Every agreement will operate to bring the
supervised releasee into the confines of Hagenow and Samson.
Since the reasonableness test probably should have applied in
Hook, and will apply in any case where a supervised releasee consents
(as required by federal law) to DNA collection, the Seventh Circuit
erred in applying the special needs test to Hook’s case. But beyond
using the wrong framework to analyze DNA collection, the court
further erred in failing to engage in a careful balancing of the relevant
interests at stake. The special needs test collapses into the
reasonableness test once a “special need” is identified251—had the
court carefully considered the privacy interests at stake in Green and
Hook, much of that reasoning would remain viable upon adoption of
the proper reasonableness test. Instead, the Seventh Circuit must
evaluate the reasonableness factors anew. Upon doing so, the court
may conclude that DNA collection as mandated by federal law is
unconstitutional with respect to probationers, and perhaps even for
persons on supervised release.
IV. BALANCING INTERESTS IN FEDERAL DNA COLLECTION
The next time the Seventh Circuit is presented with the DNA
collection of a federal probationer or a supervised releasee, the
Seventh Circuit should disclaim the special needs test and adopt the
reasonableness framework. In doing so, it is key that the Seventh
Circuit engage in a careful weighing of the interests involved, since
250

Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2201; see also Freeman, 479 F.3d at 748 (“The Court
[in Samson] noted ‘that some States and the Federal Government require a level of
individualized suspicion,’ and strongly implied that in such jurisdictions a
suspicionless search would remain impermissible. Parolee searches are therefore an
example of the rare instance in which the contours of a federal constitutional right
are determined, in part, by the content of state law.”) (quoting Samson, 126 S. Ct. at
2201).
251
See the discussion of United States v. Amerson in the Second Circuit, supra
Part II(A).
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many of the assumptions in Green and Hook no longer hold true. For
instance, in Samson the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that
persons on supervised release are closer to prisoners in their privacy
interests; while it is clear that probationers likewise have a diminished
expectation of privacy, it is not clear how a probationer’s interest will
compare to a supervised releasee’s interest. In Hook, however, the
Seventh Circuit rejected Hook’s attempt to distinguish between
Green’s incarcerated prisoners and himself, stated that no distinction
existed between those in custody and those on supervised release.252
Under the reasonableness approach, DNA collection may not pass
constitutional muster for probationers or supervised releasees. As the
Supreme Court reiterated in Samson, the reasonableness of a search is
determined by weighing the degree of intrusion on an individual’s
privacy against the degree to which the search is needed to promote
legitimate governmental interests.253 Before weighing the interests
involved, however, the Seventh Circuit should first reevaluate which
search is at issue.
Courts analyzing DNA collection have largely focused on the
initial blood draw as the relevant Fourth Amendment search. But as
mentioned above, some courts have held that more than one search
takes place when DNA is collected: first, the physical drawing of
blood (or swabbing of cheek cells, or similar method for obtaining
DNA); and second, the subsequent biochemical analysis of that
sample.254 On the other hand, some courts have held that if the initial

252

United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 772 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Griffin for
the observation that supervised releasees, like probationers, are not entitled to the
same absolute liberty to which a citizen is entitled.).
253
Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2197.
254
E.g., United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 276 (D. Mass. 2007);
Banks v. Gonzales, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1254 (N.D. Okla. 2006); State v. Transou,
201 S.W.3d 607, 619 (Tenn. 2006) (citations omitted). Although some probationers
or parolees further argue that every comparison of their DNA against other samples
via CODIS is an additional search, this reasoning has not been adopted by a court.
E.g., Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 498-99 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that “the
consequences of the contrary conclusion would be staggering”).
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search is lawful, any later use of the evidence is not a search under the
Fourth Amendment.255
Which search the court analyzes has serious implications in a
balancing of the privacy interests at stake. In other contexts, the
Seventh Circuit has recognized that more than one search may occur
within the same series of events, and that each search must be
evaluated individually.256 Courts are disingenuous when they support
the outcome of their balancing tests based only on the privacy interests
implicated in the search that occurs when a DNA sample is
obtained.257 Instead, the Seventh Circuit should evaluate the “second
search” that occurs when the DNA sample undergoes processing and is
uploaded into the CODIS system. If the court does so, it is bound to
find that the privacy interests at stake shift dramatically.
Unlike fingerprints, it cannot properly be said that “the DNA
profile derived from [a] defendant’s blood sample establishes only a
record of the defendant’s identity—otherwise personal information in
which the qualified offender can claim no right of privacy once
lawfully convicted of a qualifying offense.”258 Moreover, in the
chemical analysis of other bodily tissues or fluids, the privacy interests
are relatively minimal—the analysis typically provides an answer to
such questions as whether a person has been drinking or using illegal
drugs. That may not be the case in DNA analysis—it has, at the very
least, the potential to reveal much more. Although a DNA profile is
theoretically comprised of “non-coding” or “junk” DNA—DNA
regions selected because those DNA sequences were not associated

255

E.g., A.A. v. Attorney General, 914 A.2d 260, 266-67 (N.J. 2007) (citing
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987)).
256
E.g., United States v. Brown, 188 F.3d 860, 864-66 (7th Cir. 1999)
(analyzing a traffic stop, a search that does not require reasonable suspicion, and the
subsequent pat-down search, which does, as two distinct searches).
257
See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 867-68 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (“The search in question, however, constitutes far more of
an intrusion than the mere insertion of a needle into an individual’s body and the
consequent extraction of a blood sample.”).
258
Id. at 837 (majority opinion).
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with physical or medical characteristics259—the notion that any DNA
is purely “junk” has been strongly refuted.260 Professor Cole clarifies
the distinction between non-coding DNA and functional DNA:
functional DNA actually performs a specific, identifiable function in
the body, whereas non-coding DNA does not yield specific physical
traits.261 But while non-coding DNA may not be “functional” in the
traditional sense, it can indicate a propensity for physical traits,
thereby creating privacy concerns.262 These concerns extend to the
short tandem repeat sequences, or STRs, that are uploaded into
CODIS.263 STRs are non-coding portions of DNA, but those
sequences may nevertheless yield information about an individual,
such as whether an individual has a propensity toward particular
genetic diseases. While some argue that none of the sequences used in
forensic STR have been found to be predictive, other STR sequences

259

United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing H.R. REP.
NO. 106-900(I) (2000)).
260
E.g., ‘Junk’ DNA Now Looks Like Powerful Regulator, Scientists Find, SCI.
DAILY, Apr. 24, 2007,
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/04/070423185538.htm; Julianna
Kettlewell, ‘Junk’ Throws Up Precious Secret, BBC NEWS, May 12, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/3703935.stm; Helen Pearson, ‘Junk’ DNA
Reveals Vital Role, NATURE NEWS, May 7, 2004,
http://www.nature.com/news/2004/040503/full/news040503-9.html; Not ‘Junk DNA’
After All: Tiny RNAs Play Big Role Controlling Genes, SCI. DAILY, Oct. 26, 2007,
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/10/071025112059.htm; Paul Rincon,
Salvage Prospect for ‘Junk’ DNA, BBC NEWS, Apr. 26, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/ 4940654.stm; Scientists Explore Function
of ‘Junk DNA,’ SCI. DAILY, Nov. 21, 2006,
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/11/061113180029.htm.
261
Simon Cole, Is the “Junk” DNA Designation Bunk?, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 54 (2007), http://colloquy.law.northwestern.edu/main/2007/09/is-thejunk-dna.html.
262
Id. at 56-57.
263
See notes and accompanying text supra note 32 and 33. The entirety of a
person’s DNA sequence is not uploaded into CODIS. Instead, only those thirteen
specific STR sequences chosen by the FBI for identification purposes are uploaded
into CODIS.
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have proven useful in tracking genetic diseases.264 As Judge Gould in
the Ninth Circuit noted, “the threat of a loss of privacy is real, even if
we cannot yet discern the full scope of the problem.”265 The privacy
interests implicated in STR DNA sequences are hotly debated,266 and
these interests deserve at the very least a closer exploration in the
Seventh Circuit.
In addition, the DNA sequences in CODIS can also yield
information about people in Judge Easterbrook’s “fourth category”—
those who have never been convicted or arrested of a crime. CODIS
yields the best matches, not only “identical” matches, and a forensic
expert takes those matches and draws conclusions based upon personal
examination. In at least one instance, a near-match in CODIS led the
investigators to suspect not the individual whose sample was included
in the system, but a close relative—in that case, a brother.267 The
potential for CODIS to yield genetic information about those never
convicted of a crime raises unique privacy concerns—many of the
courts, and indeed the Seventh Circuit, have recognized that a free
citizen has a much greater expectation of privacy than one convicted
of a crime, and free citizens generally cannot be subjected to searches
264

Cole, supra note 261, at 58-59 (citing David H. Kaye, Science Fiction and
Shed DNA, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 62 (2006),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2006/7/; Colin Kimpton et al.,
Report on the Second EDNAP Collaborative STR Exercise, 71 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L
137 (1995)).
265
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 842 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J.,
concurring).
266
See, e.g., TANIA SIMONCELLI & SHELDON KRIMSKY, A NEW ERA OF DNA
COLLECTIONS: AT WHAT COST TO CIVIL LIBERTIES? (2007),
http://www.acslaw.org/node/5338; Colloquy, Privacy Risks of DNA Archiving, 101
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 62 (2006),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/prior-colloquies/junkdna.html; Symposium, DNA Fingerprinting and Civil Liberties, 34 J.L. & MED.
ETHICS 147 (2006).
267
Heather Bennett, Comment, Taking the “Banks” Out of Banks v. Gonzales:
DNA Databanks and the Fourth Amendment Prohibition on Unreasonable Searches
and Seizures, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 547, 573-74 (2007) (citing
Flowers v. Indiana, 654 N.E.2d 1124, 1124 (Ind. 1995)).
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without a warrant or probable cause.268 DNA collections clearly raise
issues that are not properly addressed when a court focuses only on the
initial DNA collection.
Many commentators have identified additional concerns in the
context of DNA searches. Some have expressed concern over the fact
that once a person has served the entirety of his sentence, the DNA
profile in CODIS nevertheless remains active.269 This indefinite
retention belies the fact that expectations of privacy vary over the
course of one’s sentence (from incarceration, to supervised release, to
probation).270 Further, DNA collection from all offenders, regardless
of offense, “does not necessarily serve the government’s interests
equally.”271 In Hook, for example, the supervised releasee was a white
collar criminal: the chance of his DNA ever being left at a future crime
scene is slim to none. Persuasive arguments also have been made that
white collar criminals do not re-offend at the same rates,272 yet the
Seventh Circuit failed to account for this possibility in looking at the
government’s interests. And as alluded to previously, it may well be
necessary to draw different conclusions when balancing the
expectations of privacy for supervised releasees as compared to
probationers, much as the Second Circuit did in Amerson. The
Supreme Court’s Samson holding indicates that the expectations of
privacy may vary substantially between these two classes.

268

See United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 772-73 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing
Knights and Griffin for the proposition that “[t]hose under supervised release do not
enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional
liberty properly dependent on observance of special restrictions.”).
269
Kincade, 379 F.3d at 841-42 (Gould, J., concurring).
270
Eric May, Who’s Next? The Continued Expansion of DNA Databases in
United States v. Kincade, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 113 (2007).
271
Id.
272
Ellen S. Podgor, Throwing Away the Key, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 279
(2007), http://thepocketpart.org/2007/02/21/podgor.html. But see Andrew
Weissmann & Joshua A. Block, White-Collar Defendants and White-Collar Crimes,
116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 286 (2007),
http://thepocketpart.org/2007/02/21/weissmann_block.html.
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In light of the unique considerations that go hand-in-hand with
DNA, the Seventh Circuit needs to engage in a detailed, fresh look at
DNA collection. If the court embraces the special concerns inherent to
DNA information, it is bound to find that the privacy interests in DNA
searches look quite different than those the court considered (or failed
to consider) in Hook.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit erred in using the special needs approach to
evaluate the constitutionality of a supervised releasee’s DNA
collection. At the time the court decided Green, the state of the
Supreme Court’s suspicionless search jurisprudence was decidedly
confusing, and the Green court can be forgiven for applying the
special needs test. After Barnett, Hagenow, and Samson, however,
both the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court had effectively closed
the door on the special needs framework as a method for analyzing
searches like the one in Hook. The Seventh Circuit should account for
those cases by adopting the reasonableness approach when next it
analyzes DNA collection. Further, where a supervised releasee
consents to a suspicionless search, as will be the case for every
qualifying federal felon subject to the federal DNA collection statutes,
Samson dictates that the consent operates to diminish the releasee’s
expectation of privacy so much that a suspicionless search becomes
inherently reasonable. Under the Second Circuit’s Amerson holding,
the Seventh Circuit may still be able to apply the special needs test to
DNA collection from probationers. Regardless of the test used,
however, the balancing of interests that a court must engage in remains
relatively unchanged—and if the interests are properly weighed, the
result is that DNA collection from either a supervised releasee or a
probationer may very well be unconstitutional.
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